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Madam Chairwoman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify
today. Superfund badly needs your attention, and I congratulate the Committee for reviving the
constitutional check and balance of rigorous oversight.
I have worked on Superfund for 25 years. I was subcommittee counsel for
Representative James J. Florio, widely perceived as the “father” of Superfund, when Congress
last reauthorized the program. I served as a senior staff person on the National Commission on
Superfund, which included the CEOs of all major stakeholders and negotiated a consensus
reauthorization of the Superfund statute, 1 only to have its work washed away by the Contract
with America. I have represented clients liable at Superfund sites and counseled clients who
wanted to avoid that fate. I teach Superfund law to students and have written five scholarly
articles on the subject, as well as a report entitled The Toll of Superfund Neglect, which is the
focus of my testimony today. 2 The report was released by the Center for Progressive Reform 3
and the Center for American Progress 4 and is available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Superfund_061506.pdf. The report analyzes the
environmental conditions and demographics of 50 of the worst sites in the nation’s ten most
populous states. 5 A list of the sites we studied is attached as Appendix A to my testimony. I
respectfully request that the report and its attachments be included in the record for this hearing.

Legends
Senior EPA political appointees and industry representatives may or may not understand
how Superfund is supposed to work. They should understand how it does work. Unfortunately,
they are not sharing either explanation with you. Instead, they have created five Superfund
legends that have little relationship to history or reality:
1

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§9601 et seq.,
I appreciate the assistance of Margaret Clune, CPR policy analyst, in preparing the original report and my research
assistants, Michael Wright and Xochitl Strohbehn, students at the University of Maryland Law School, who helped
me prepare this testimony.
3
The Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) is an organization of 45 academics who specialize in the legal,
economic, and scientific issues that surround federal regulation to protect public health, natural resources, and
worker safety. One component of the Center's mission is to circulate academic papers, studies, and other analyses
that promote public policy based on the multiple social values that motivated the enactment of our nation's health,
safety and environmental laws. We seek to inform the public about scholarship that envisions government as an
arena where members of society choose and preserve their collective values. We reject the idea that government's
only function is to increase the economic efficiency of private markets. For more information, please see
http://progressivereform.org.
4
The Center for American Progress is a progressive think-tank dedicated to improving the lives of Americans
through ideas and action. It is committed to creating a long-term, progressive vision for America—a vision that
policy makers, thought-leaders and activists can use to shape the national debate and pass laws that make a
difference. For more information, please see http://www.americanprogress.org.
5
The report selected the 50 sites on the basis of the severity of contamination, their proximity to people, whether
construction has been completed at the facility, and other criteria. See pages 157-162 of The Toll of Superfund
Neglect for a full description of our selection methodology. In the year since the report was issued, construction has
been completed at two sites on the list: the ALCOA (Point Comfort)/Lavaca Bay in Texas and the UGI Columbia
Gas Plant in Pennsylvania.
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Few if any sites endanger public health.
Because EPA has only recently gotten down to the worst, most complex sites,
cleanup has slowed, with the construction phase of remedial action 6 completed at
only 24 sites in 2007, as compared to 87 sites in 2000. 7
EPA has enough money without renewal of the Superfund tax.
Superfund taxes are onerous.
Companies that created the sites are paying to clean them up.

Truth
The truth is that Superfund’s creators intended it to be a three-legged stool:
1. systematic identification and prioritization of abandoned toxic waste sites all over the
country that require cleanup;
2. creation of a multi-billion dollar fund supported by industry taxes to both prime the
pump for cleanup and pay for so-called “orphan” sites; and
3. strict, joint, and several liability that gives responsible parties that created the sites
compelling incentives to clean them up and allows government to recover most of the
money spent upfront.
Over the last several years, EPA’s political leadership has sawed the first leg in half, removed the
second leg, and left the third leg to rot to its core. No wonder the program is in trouble.
The assertion that long-neglected Superfund sites are not harming anybody and can safely
be neglected is ludicrous. Indeed, if the people who advance this legend believe it to be true, we
would have a more honest debate if we discussed whether we could safely wind down
Superfund, ending the program within some fixed timeline. No one wants to go there, and for
good reason.
Thousands of uncontrolled federal and state Superfund sites plague communities across
the nation. Our report offers a snapshot of these conditions. Most of the 50 sites we studied are
located in heavily populated urban or suburban neighborhoods. Many have languished on the
Superfund National Priorities List for two decades. Often no more than holes in the ground, they
leak toxic soups comprised of hundreds of chemicals into the air, soil, or water, including PCBs,
creosote, lead, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, chromium, copper, zinc, cadmium, arsenic,
mercury, and trichloroethylene. The sites sit atop aquifers used for drinking water, leak toxic
chemicals into rivers and streams used for swimming and recreation, contaminate soil where
6

As the Subcommittee is aware, completing construction does not mean that a site is finished, and does not pose a
risk to the public. Especially where remedies are temporary, long-term monitoring, operation and maintenance are
essential to ensure that risks remain contained.
7
An EPA chart submitted to the subcommittee shows 47 “construction complete” sites in 2001, 42 in 2002, 40
annually in 2003-2005, and 24 in 2007. These numbers are substantially less than annual figures for the preceding
six years which were 68 (1993), 61 (1994), 68 (1995), 64 (1996), 88 (1997), 87 (1998), 85 (1999), and 87 (2000).
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children play with hazardous wastes, and in one particularly tragic and egregious case, provide
the foundation for an apartment building that is still occupied. 8
Millions of people live in the census tracts 9 where the sites are located, including
hundreds of thousands of children. Many of these communities are low income and comprised
of people of color. Of the 50 sites we studied, 60 percent were located in neighborhoods where
households reported median incomes in the range of $40,000 and some 26 percent were in the
midst of populations comprised of 40 percent or more racial or ethnic minorities.
The second legend, contending that cleanup has slowed because EPA did the easy sites
first, is half true. It is difficult to complete cleanup at the biggest, most contaminated sites, such
as (1) the Operating Industries site, a 190-acre municipal landfill in the Los Angeles suburbs
where millions of gallons of liquid hazardous waste was poured over densely packed household
garbage, producing leachate that contains vinyl chloride, benzene tetrachoroethylene, and heavy
metals 10 or (2) the 160-acre Lawrence Aviation Industries site in Suffolk County, New York,
where the owner poured unknown quantities of TCE and acid sludges onto the ground and into
two unlined lagoons. 11
But up until a few years ago, our government rolled up its sleeves and deployed the
complicated technology and significant resources that are required to get difficult jobs done.
Agencies in charge of such efforts did not come to Congress demanding fewer resources as these
challenges became more daunting, as EPA now does.
This bizarre development brings us to the third legend: EPA has all the money it needs to
complete cleanup. The broad-based industry taxes that support the program expired in 1995.
President Clinton asked Congress to extend them every year he was in office, and every year, the
Congress refused the request. The Bush Administration opposes extension of the tax and has
made up chronic shortfalls by drawing on general taxpayer revenues and steadily lowering
annual appropriations. In FY 2003, EPA ran through all the money left over from the years
when the program was supported by industry taxes and the program has been exclusively
supported by general revenues ever since.
Not only are the wrong people paying to support a program that is starved for resources,
crucial tasks are increasingly left undone. In constant dollars, revenues appropriated for the

8

See page 71 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a description of the Normandy Park Apartments site in
Hillsborough County, Florida.
9
Census tracks are small geographic areas averaging 4,000 people. See https://ask.census.gov.
10
See page 38 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a description of the Operating Industries site.
11
See page 60 of The Toll of Superfund Neglect for a description of the Lawrence Aviation site.
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Superfund program now stand at levels 40 percent lower than the amounts Congress specified
when it last reauthorized the program in 1986. 12
As any businessperson knows, it takes money to make money. Not only are there
hundreds of sites at the federal level that need investigation so cleanup plans can be made,
thousands of additional sites have ended up in the states’ laps. Even if they wanted to, EPA and
the states cannot go to court to demand responsible party cleanups without first completing these
investigations and writing cleanup plans and, without more money, they have little hope of
cleaning up orphan sites where no responsible party is available. Yet EPA has precipitously cut
the funding for states to do the technical analysis necessary to determine what should be done
about these hazards. 13 The result is that the sites are swept out of sight, getting worse and worse
as their public health and environmental implications are buried in a sea of mind-numbing,
“don’t-worry-be-happy” EPA statistics.
Let me give you another example. I teach at the University of Maryland School of Law
in Baltimore. This past spring, Dr. Joshua Sharfstein, the City’s Public Health Commissioner,
closed a popular baseball field called Swann Park after old documents came to light revealing
that in the late 1970’s, arsenic from a nearby Allied Signal pesticide plant had blown onto the
park, insinuating itself into the soil at toxic levels. The Maryland Department of the
Environment managed to overcome the funding gap that has paralyzed its state Superfund
efforts, and ordered that the park be remediated. Undoubtedly, the saga of Swann Park is but the
dusting of snow on top of the iceberg, as we will learn over the next decades unless we
resuscitate both the federal and state Superfund programs.
The fourth legend is that Superfund taxes are too onerous and corporate responsible
parties are already paying their fair share through cleanups ordered by past consent decrees.
Glossing over the implications of these missing resources, EPA and industry representatives
argue that the Superfund tax would amount to double dipping against these responsible parties.
The truth is that before they expired in 1995, Superfund taxes raised revenues of
approximately $1.5 billion annually, or $4 million daily, from taxes on crude oil and chemical
feedstocks and through a broad-based corporate tax. As the following chart shows, annual
Superfund tax revenues amount to 1.79 percent of the 2006 profits of just six of the nation’s
largest oil and petrochemical companies. The CEO salaries of these six companies alone would
cover almost six weeks of missing revenues.

12

See page 3 of the testimony of Katherine N. Probst, Senior Fellow and Director, Risk, Resource, and
Environmental Management, Resources for the Future, before this Committee at a Superfund oversight hearing held
on June 15, 2006, available at http://epw.senate.gov/public/heating_statements.cfm?id=257181.
13
For information on state funding shortfalls, see EPA, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation Report No.
2004-P-00027, Some States Cannot Address Assessment Needs and Face Limitations in Meeting Future Superfund
Cleanup Requirements (September 1, 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/20040901-2004-P00027.pdf.
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Company Name
Exxon Mobil
Chevron
ConocoPhillips
Valero Energy
Marathon Oil
Sunoco
TOTAL
Tax Rate Needed To Produce
1.5 Billion

2007 Fortune 500
Rank
2
4
5
16
30
60

Money in
Millions
39,500,000,000
17,138,000,000
15,550,000,000
5,463,000,000
5,234,000,000
979,000,000
83,864,000,000

% Change
from 2005
9.30%
21.60%
14.90%
52.20%
72.60%
0.50%

CEO Name
Rex Tillerson
David O'Reilly
James Mulva
William Klesse
Clarence Cazalot
John Drosdick

1.79%

*New CEO (Some Compensation May Relfect Another Executive) Per Forbes.com (visited 10/12/07).
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/12/Rank_6.html
^ Prior Year Data
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/12/Rank_6.html (visited 10/12/07)

As for the assertion that responsible parties are shouldering the large majority of the
burden for cleaning up Superfund sites, we confront yet another half-truth. At sites where
cleanup orders were issued well before today’s enforcement doldrums, responsible parties are
moving cleanup along, often at a clip faster than government-funded cleanups. But at countless
other sites, some of the nation’s most prominent corporations have backed off their obligations,
apparently waiting for federal and state enforcement officials to come compel them to address
their responsibilities.
An analysis by the Center for Public Integrity completed in 2007 relied on confidential
EPA enforcement material to compile a list of the 100 large companies that have the most
Superfund sites, breaking down this data to show the numbers of sites on the list that remain
unaddressed years and even decades after listing. 14
For example, the 75-acre Universal Oil Products site in East Rutherford, New Jersey was
first listed in 1983 and is heavily contaminated with 4.5 million gallons of waste solvents and
solid chemical wastes. Honeywell, the only responsible party at the site, is leading cleanup
efforts, which have crawled along for a quarter century. According to the most recent EPA site

14

See Center for Public Integrity, Wasting Away, Superfund’s Toxic Legacy (2007), a series of reports, all of which
are available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/Superfund/.
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2006 CEO
Compensation
($ in Millions)
4,120,000*^
8,800,000
31,340,000
10,910,000*
37,480,000
46,190,000
163,740,000

description posted on the web this past February, an investigation into contamination of onsite
wetlands and creek areas did not begin until 2005 and still are not completed. 15

Conclusion
More than any other environmental program, Superfund is a victim of compassion fatigue
and political doublespeak. The federal government and responsible parties have dragged their
feet on cleanup for so long that it has been impossible for the public at large to maintain the level
of outrage that propelled the birth of the program in 1980 and Congress’ decision to increase
Superfund resources six-fold in 1986. In many locations, cosmetic changes have been made –
rusting barrels have been removed from the surface and vegetation has reemerged on what were
moonscapes 20 years ago. Beneath the surface, though, little has really changed. The toxic
stews continue to circulate, moldering and spreading, adding chemicals to aquifers, rising to the
surface of the soil as the land freezes and thaws, and releasing methane and other volatile gases.
For the sake of those living in the census tracts containing the 50 sites detailed in this
report, as well as the untold other people living near hazardous waste sites across the country,
CPR urges this Committee to support the reinstatement of Superfund taxes and continue its
rigorous oversight of the implementation of this vital program.
Thank you again for inviting me.

15

Universal Oil Products, New Jersey, EPA ID# NJD002005106, available at
http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfund/npl/0200101c.pdf.
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APPENDIX A – 50 PROFILED SITES
STATE
California

Texas

SITE NAME
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

New York

•
•
•
•
•

Florida

•
•
•
•
•

Illinois

•
•
•
•
•

Pennsylvania

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ohio

Michigan

New Jersey

Georgia

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Aerojet General Corp.
Iron Mountain Mine
McCormick & Baxter Creosoting
Operating Industries Landfill
Stringfellow
ALCOA (Point Comfort)/Lavaca Bay
Gulfco Marine Maintenance
Jasper Creosoting Company Inc.
R&H Oil/Tropicana
Star Lake Canal
Computer Circuits
Consolidated Iron & Metal
Lawrence Aviation Industries, Inc.
Liberty Industrial Finishing
Old Roosevelt Field Contaminated GW Area
American Creosote Works (Pensacola Pit)
Escambia Wood – Pensacola
Normandy Park Apartments
Reeves Southeast Galvanizing Corp.
Stauffer Chemical Corp. (Tarpon Springs)
Circle Smelting Corp.
DePue/New Jersey Zinc/Mobil Chem Corp.
Indian Refinery – Texaco Lawrenceville
Parsons Casket Hardware Co.
Sauget Area 1
East Tenth Street
Lower Darby Creek Area
Sharon Steel (Farrell Works Disp. Area)
UGI Columbia Gas Plant
Watson Johnson Landfill
Armco, Inc., Hamilton Plant
Diamond Shamrock Corp. (Painesville Wks)
Dover Chemical Corp.
Nease Chemical
North Sanitary Landfill
Barrels, Inc.
Bay City Middlegrounds
Bofors Nobel, Inc.
Rockwell International Corp.
State Disposal Landfill, Inc.
Cornell Dubilier Electronics, Inc.
CPS/Madison Industries
Universal Oil Products (Chemical Division)
Ventron/Velsicol
Vineland Chemical Co., Inc.
Brunswick Wood Preserving
Camilla Wood Preserving Company
LCP Chemicals Georgia
Terry Creek Drdge Spoil Areas/Herc. Outfall
Woolfolk Chemical Works, Inc.
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HRS
SCORE
54.63
56.16
74.86
57.22
61.4
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50.65
50
58.41
50
49.98
58.75
50
70.71
70.71
56.67
55.58
61.85
67.68
50
50
50.78
71
69.34
50
50
47.19
50
42.24
50
53.42
52.15
42.24
50.27
69.73
54.63
51.38
59.16
54.49
50
60.14
50.18
42.24

DATE ADDED
TO THE NPL
Sept. 8, 1983
Sept. 8, 1983
Oct. 14, 1992
June 10, 1986
Sept. 8, 1983
Feb. 23, 1994
April 30, 2003
July 28, 1998
Proposed on June 14, 2001
July 27, 2000
May 10, 1999
June 14, 2001
Feb. 4, 2000
June 10, 1986
May 11, 2000
Sept. 8, 1983
Dec. 16, 1994
Proposed on Feb. 13, 1995
Sept. 8, 1983
May 31, 1994
Proposed on June 17, 1996
May 10, 1999
Dec. 1, 2000
July 22, 1987
Proposed on Sept. 13, 2001
Proposed on Jan. 18, 1994
June 14, 2001
July 28, 1998
May 31, 1994
Sept. 13, 2001
Proposed on April 30, 2003
Proposed on May 10, 1993
Proposed on May 10, 1993
Sept. 8, 1983
May 31, 1994
Oct. 4, 1989
Proposed on Feb. 13, 1995
March 31, 1989
July 22, 1987
Feb. 21, 1990
July 28, 1998
Sept. 8, 1983
Sept. 8, 1983
Sept. 21, 1984
Sept. 21, 1984
April 1, 1997
July 28, 1998
June 17, 1996
Proposed on April 1, 1997
Aug. 30, 1990

